Robert Mugabe, the Secretary-General of ZANU and Youth Secretary, Edgar Tekere, crossed the border into Mozambique to join the ZANLA guerillas in the ZANLA rear base camps in early April 1975, writes Dr Felix Muchemwa in his book The Struggle For Land in Zimbabwe (1890 – 2010) that The Patriot is serialising.

Rhodesian Propaganda
THERE was almost a total communication black-out after the death of Herbert Chitepo, especially around May 1975, and in an effort to convince the Rhodesian white population and the world at large that the military situation in Rhodesia was very much under control, the Rhodesian military intelligence issued highly inflated guerilla casualty figures.
Claims were that in 1974 alone, over 345 guerillas had been killed, with 75 percent of the guerilla leadership having been virtually wiped out by July. (Wilkinson et al., 1976)
For the period 1973-1974, the number of guerillas killed was given as 524 with an African civilian casualty figure of 170.
It was also claimed that in the north-east part of Rhodesia, there remained only 350-400 ZANLA guerillas with an average age of 19. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: p.170)
The intended impression was that Rhodesian forces had virtually wiped out all hard-core ZANLA guerillas and were (therefore) faced with a leaderless, young and inexperienced ZANLA guerilla force which could easily be destroyed.
The figures also revealed that for the period of 1973-1974, the Rhodesian Security force death toll was only 96, with a European civilian casualty figure of 16.
On the whole, this gave a kill-ratio of five-to-one in favour of the Rhodesian security forces.
However, even the distorted kill-ratio of five-to-one was not good enough. It was still realistically and totally unaffordable given that the white population was only 260 000 against an African population of more than 5 000 000 people. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: pp. 145-146).
Mugabe and Tekere cross into Mozambique
It was at this very critical time of the Zimbabwe revolution, Second Chimurenga, that Robert Mugabe, the Secretary-General of ZANU and Youth Secretary, Edgar Tekere, crossed the border into Mozambique to join the ZANLA guerillas in the ZANLA rear base camps in early April 1975.
Mugabe and Tekere joined nearly
2 000 other recruits at Vila Perry, but for security reasons, FRELIMO shifted them to Quelimane. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: pp.207-208)
Meanwhile, there still remained a serious power struggle between the leaders of the UANC, Abel Muzorewa, Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole and James Chikerema, despite all the obvious signs that the Zimbabwe revolution, Second Chimurenga, was grinding to a halt.
Mgagao Declaration
Eventually, ZANLA commanders in Mpima Prison in Zambia and those in Mgagao broke the silence on the progress of the revolution. In a document, later known as the Mgagao Declaration, the ZANLA commanders in Mgagao Training Camp in Tanzania wrote:
“We strongly condemn and completely dissociate ourselves from the Nkomo faction of the ANC.”
On Muzorewa, Sithole and Chikerema, the Mgagao Declaration document went on and declared that these leaders had:“Proved to be completely hopeless and ineffective as leaders of the Zimbabwe Revolution.”
The ZANLA commanders, however, added that: “An executive member who has been astounding is Robert Mugabe.
He has demonstrated this by defying the rigours of guerilla life in the jungles of Mozambique.
Since we respect him most, in all our dealings with the ANC leadership, he is the only person who can act as a middleman.
We will not accept any direct discussions with any of the three leading members of the ANC.
We can only talk through Robert Mugabe to them.”
The ZANLA guerilla commanders then concluded:
“We have at present 60 military instructors without any work at all because of the current situation. We just cannot afford to stand and stare at the Smith regime and allied forces of reaction whittling away every ounce of rights of the people of Zimbabwe. If we cannot live as free men, we rather choose to die as free men.”
In conclusion, the ZANLA commanders appealed to the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and to the Tanzanian and Mozambican governments to allow them to resume the war. They asked for the release of arms and ammunition which had been supplied by China. (Martin and Johnson, 1981: pp.200-202)